(The following article is reprinted by the Young-Sanders Center with
permission granted by the Louisiana Historical Association and
The Center for Louisiana Studies)
Volume XXIII, No. 1
General Richard Taylor
As a military Commander
By: Arthur W. Bergeron, Jr.
At the command level, professional soldiers largely directed the American Civil War. West Point graduates dominated the upper echelons of the armies of both the North and the South. In fact, only thirty-three percent of the general officers on both sides had no military training or experience. Professor T. Harry Williams computed that in the sixty largest battles of the war West Point graduates “command both armies in fifty-five and in the remaining five a graduate commanded one of the opposing armies.”1 The professionals certainly have received more attention in books and articles written about the war. These men, by and large, were successful or at least competent commanders. All three of the men designated by Professor Williams as the only “great” generals of the war—Lee, Grant, and Sherman—had graduated from the United States Military Academy.2
Yet the large size of the armies involved in the Civil War made it almost inevitable that men with no military training (call them civilians) would become general officers. Northern politics also dictated that Lincoln appoint many of these civilians to important commands. As in other wars, these civilian generals usually proved to be failures or at best second-rate commanders. For example, the Union chief of staff wrote on one occasion: “It seems little better than murder to give important commands to such men as Banks,
1 T. Harry Williams, Hayes of the Twenty-third: The Civil War Volunteer Officer (New York, 1965), pp. 21-22; Ezra J. Warner, Generals in Gray (Baton Rouge, 1959), pp. xx-xxi; Ezra J. Warner, Generals in Blue (Baton Rouge, 1964), p. xx.
2 T. Harry Williams, “The Military Leadership of the North and South,” in Why the North Won the Civil War, edited by David Donald (Baton Rouge, 1960), p. 30.
Butler, McClernand, Sigel, and Lew Wallace,…”3 A few of these civilians, however, did quite well and demonstrated that they could compete with the best of the professionals. Perhaps the leading non-professional was Nathan Bedford Forrest, whose cavalry or mounted infantry tactics were studied in European as well as American military circles for many years after the war.
Richard Taylor, son of General and President Zachary Taylor, merits a place next to Forrest as a first-rate general, but he has not received the recognition which he deserves from Civil War historians. There are probably several reasons for this. First, Taylor’s campaigns in Louisiana have been thought to be more important the Trans-Mississippi Department than to the Confederacy as a whole; second, the number of troops involved made the Louisiana campaigns seem small and insignificant; and third, the operations that took place lacked the dash of those in the major theaters of the war and thus may seem almost dull in comparison. Still, Taylor mastered the strategy and tactics of Louisiana warfare and showed an ability to command larger forces. He was undoubtedly the most outstanding high-ranking military commander from Louisiana during the war. Beauregard showed some promise but had several deficiencies working against him; Bragg, like McClellan, could organize an army but lacked the will to use it properly; and Polk was a trouble-maker and mediocre field commander. This article will briefly analyze Taylor’s career and demonstrate why he deserves the ranking of a superb general.
Dick Taylor, as his friends usually called him, did not follow in his father’s footsteps by pursuing a military career. After graduating from Yale in 1845, he became a sugar planter in St. Charles Parish and later entered the Louisiana legislature. His only exposure to warfare prior to 1861 occurred in 1846, when he visited briefly his father at Matamoras during the Mexican War.4 At his
3 U. S. War Department, War of the Rebellion: Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, 128 parts in 70 vols. (Washington, D.C., 1880-1901), Series I, Vol. XXXIV, Pt. 3, 332-33 (hereinafter cited as O. R.)
4 Jackson Beauregard Davis, “The Life of Richard Taylor,” Louisiana Historical Quarterly, XXIV (1941), 50-63; Holman Hamilton, Zachary Taylor, Soldier of the Republic (Hamden, Conn., 1966), p. 75; Holman Hamilton, “A Youth of Good Morals’: Zachary Taylor Sends His Only Son to School,” The Filson Club Quarterly, XXVII (1953), 304-05; Richard Taylor, Destruction and Reconstruction: Personal Experiences of the Late War, edited by Richard B. Harwell (New York, 1955), pp. xvii, 6-7, 293.
Plantation, Taylor continued his education. He collected a large library and spent his spare time reading not only literary classics but military history as well. A friend wrote of him in later years:
....The ample leisure afforded by the planter’s life of that day he devoted to constant and laborious studies,…He had a marvelous memory and a rare faculty of intellectual digestion and assimilation. The variety, extent, and exactness of his information on all kinds of subjects were matter for wonder to all who had the good fortune to come in contact with him.5
This combination of intelligence and a good memory would later help to make Taylor an excellent commander.
A scanning of Taylor’s memoirs indicates that he did read a large number of books on military history and the art of war. Some of the authors he mentions (both directly and indirectly) are Frederick the Great, French Marshall Turenne, French Marshall Villars, Henri Jomini, French Marshall Bugeaud, Maurice of Saxe, Julius Ceasar, and Napoleon Bonaparte. This list is, of course, incomplete, but should indicate which writers had more influence on his thinking than others. Even a cursory reading of Taylor’s memoirs lends great credence to the following statement made by a contemporary of his:
…Probably no civilian of his time was more deeply versed in the annals of war, including the achievements and personal characteristics of all the great captains, the details and philosophy of their campaigns, and their strategic theories and practice.6
The words “professional soldier” might well be substituted for “Civilian” in this quote.
Richard Taylor, then, on the eve of the Civil War, was a man with a rare knowledge of military history and the art of war. Though he lacked the experience of a professional soldier, he was not restricted to the limited strategy and tactics as taught and practiced at West point. His military thinking was a blending of the art of war as advocated by men whose books he had read. In his
5 Charles E. Fenner, “Richard Taylor,” in Library of Southern Literature, edited by Edwin A. Alderman and Joel Chandler Harris, 17 vols. (Atlanta, 1907), XII, 5199.
6 Ibid., 5200.
Memoirs, he wrote: “The cardinal principles on which the art of war is based are few and unchangeable, resembling in this the code of morality; but their application varies at the theater of the war, the genius and temper of the people engaged, and the kind of arms employed.”7 This quote indicates that while he may have borrowed concepts from the great thinkers of the past, he did not adhere to them rigidly as did many Civil War generals.
Taylor entered Confederate service as Colonel of the 9th Louisiana Infantry Regiment in July 1861 and took his unit to Virginia. Three months later he received a commission as brigadier general. His services in Virginia fell primarily under Major General Thomas J. “Stonewall” Jackson. He learned a great deal about the practical art of command from Jackson and Major General Richard S. Ewell during Jackson’s famous Shenandoah Valley Campaign of 1862. As both a regimental and brigade commander, Taylor had a reputation as a strict disciplinarian.8 In several battles fought in the Valley, Taylor demonstrated courage under fire, thus encouraging his men to follow him into battle with more bravery themselves. His brigade, not the famed Stonewall Brigade, set the pace for the long marches made in the Valley.9 In winning several battles for Jackson, the conduct of Taylor and his men greatly impressed Stonewall, and noted historian Douglas Southall Freeman tells us just how much:
…There could be no greater tribute to [Taylor’s] efficiency as administrator and field commander than the fact that after a few days’ contact with Taylor’s troops in the Valley of Virginia, Jackson virtually appropriated them from Ewell’s division and used them as confidently as he did his own ‘Stonewall’ Brigade.10
7 Taylor, Destruction and Reconstruction, p. 30.
8 Ibid., pp. 11-12, 38-40; Davis, “The Life of Richard Taylor,” 61-62; O. R., 1, V, 936; [T. K. Roby], “Reminiscences of a Private,” Confederate Veteran, XXIII (1915), 549; Henry E. Handerson, Yankee in Gray: The Civil War Memoirs of Henry E. Handerson (Cleveland, 1962), P. 31.
9 Taylor, Destruction and Reconstruction, pp. 55-56, 64, 84-85; John H. Worsham, On of Jackson’s Foot Cavalry, edited by James I. Robertson, Jr. (Jackson, Tenn., 1964), p. 46; Henry Kyd Douglas, I Rode with Stonewall (Chapel Hill, 1940), p. 58; O. R., 1, XII, Pt. 1, 715; Douglas Southall Freeman, Lee’s Lieutenants: A Study in Command, 3 vols. (New York, 1945), I, 484.
10 Douglas Southall Freeman, The South to Posterity (New York, 1939), p. 85.
In July 1862, upon the recommendation of Stonewall Jackson, the War Department promoted Taylor to major general and issued orders assigning him to command of Confederate forces in western Louisiana.11 The Confederate high command expected great things of Taylor in Louisiana. The state had fallen into an almost helpless condition following the capture of New Orleans and needed a strong hand to defend it. As one of the most promising young officers in the army in Virginia and with his knowledge of the state and its people, Taylor was expected to provide that strong hand. The Virginia campaigns had developed his latent abilities as a commander. Had he remained in that state, Taylor would undoubtedly have turned into an outstanding division commander and may have even risen to corps command. But he was destined to perform his greatest service to the Confederacy in western Louisiana. As Freeman has stated, however, “The Army [of Northern Virginia] was the poorer for Taylor’s departure.”12
Taylor had all of the attributes of an exceptional commander when he left Virginia. He was extremely intelligent, well-read in military history, and possessed of a marvelous memory. In this Valley he had gained command experience and had profited by his association with men like Stonewall Jackson and Dick Ewell. Professor Williams wrote that a great commander must “have in his make-up a mental strength and moral power that enables him to dominate whatever event or crisis may emerge on the field of battle.”13 Taylor had shown this trait time and again in the Shenandoah Valley. Add to this the ability to gain the respect and obedience of his men and calmness under fire, and one certainly has a picture of an above-average commander.
Warfare in Louisiana during the Civil War differed from that fought in most other theaters. Taylor had a small army which faced greatly superior enemy forces, and his men had a large area to protect from invasion. The rivers, bayous, and streams that crisscrossed
11 O. R., I, XV, 789; Major General Thomas J. Jackson to General Samuel Cooper, June 10, 1862, in Complied Service Record of Richard Taylor, Record Group 109, National Archives; Douglas Southall Freeman, ed., Lee’s Dispatches: Unpublished Letters of General Robert E. Lee, C. S. A., to Jefferson Davis and the War Department of the Confederate States of America, 1861-1865 (New York, 1957), p. 36.
12 Freeman, Lee’s Lieutenants, I, 669.
13 Williams, “The Military Leadership of the North and South,” 25.
Taylor’s district allowed the Federals to support their armies with ironclad and “tinclad” gunboats. All of these factors forced Taylor to stress marching and maneuver and to avoid pitched battles, except when his force equaled in strength his opponents. The Confederates in Louisiana also faced frequent shortages of military supplies, and Taylor depended heavily on captured enemy arms and equipment. From Stonewall Jackson, Taylor learned the value of supplies; he recalled that during a retreat Jackson “would fight for a wheelbarrow.”14 Taylor followed suit, for one of his company commanders wrote:
…Gen. Taylor is a very quiet, unassuming little fellow, but noisy on retreats, with a tendency to cuss mules and wagons which stall in the road.15
Taylor’s early campaigns in Louisiana produced few large battles, but his men won practically every engagement they fought. He retreated only when outflanked or opposed by superior numbers. Even in retreat Taylor’s army harassed and slowed the enemy’s advance. A typical Taylor operation consisted of a speedy concentration of forces from several points and a successful attack against a part of the enemy’s army. Taylor’s army, though small, had confidence not only in its commander but in itself. His operations raised the morale of the state’s people and gave them the desire to support him and his army in defending the state. Like George Washington in the American Revolution, Taylor achieved on of his primary tasks—he kept his army intact and ready to assume the offensive whenever the opportunity presented itself.
Taylor’s greatest triumphs came in the Red River Campaign of 1864. As early as January of that year he correctly predicted that the Federals would conduct joint operations up the Red River and in Arkansas against Shreveport. He began preparing for the campaign and suggested to his superior, General Edmund Kirby Smith, how the Confederates should construct their strategy. He pointed out that it would be necessary to concentrate available forces against one of the enemy columns of face being overpowered by each. In a letter to Kirby Smith he stated:
14 Taylor, Destruction and Reconstruction, pp. 60-61.
15 Quoted in Napier Bartlett, Military Record of Louisiana (Baton Rouge, 1964), “The Trans-Mississippi,” 11.
…too much importance cannot be given to the subject of roads and depots. Holding the country in the spring is simply a question of rapid marching. The radii from Homes [in Arkansas], Magruder [in Texas], and myself, converging to some common center, should be put in the best order circumstances and our means admit, and there maintained by constant supervision.16
To facilitate the movement of troops from one point to another, Taylor suggested the establishment of supply depots along the main roads in Arkansas, Texas, and Louisiana. They would provide much-needed food and supplies in areas where these articles were scarce and would lessen the need for extensive wagon trains. Here Taylor recognized the value of interior lines for concentration against different enemy columns so as to defeat them in detail. His previous experience had shown that speed was vital, and he hoped to speed marches by the establishment of these depots. Kirby Smith adopted Taylor’s suggestion and ordered depots to be set up at various points, and the depots did play a significant role in the upcoming campaign.17
The anticipated Federal movements began in mid-March. Major General Nathaniel P. Banks advanced on Alexandria with an army of 28,000 men and a fleet of more than twenty gunboats. In Arkansas, a Federal army of 10,000 men advanced from Little Rock toward Shreveport. Taylor’s army in Louisiana numbered approximately 6,100 men. Until these reinforcements could reach him, Taylor fell back slowly before Bank’s advance. The Texas cavalry arrived about April 1, but Kirby Smith detained the infantry in Shreveport several days longer. He was unsure which Federal column he should concentrate against despite the fact that Bank’s army was larger and closer to Shreveport. None of Taylor’s urgent pleas for action prompted Kirby Smith to quit vacillating and wasting time.18
16 O. R., 1, XXXIV, Pt. 2, 879; Taylor Destruction and Reconstruction, p. 182.
17 O. R., 1, XXXIV Pt. 2, 943.
18 Ibid., Pt. 2, 167-68, 485, 505, 513-14, 517-18, 520-22, 526, 562, 657, and Pt. 2, 879, 948, 1027, 1041-42, 1056, 1057; Taylor, Destruction and Reconstruction, pp. 184-91; Ludwell H. Johnson, Red River Campaign: Politics and Cotton in the Civil War (Baltimore, 1958), pp. 99-100.
Faced with Kirby Smith’s indecision, Taylor took it upon himself to stop Bank’s advance before it could reach Shreveport. He selected a site near the village of Mansfield and made his dispositions for the coming battle. Although Taylor had only 8,000 men available for combat, he expressed confidence of success. This confidence spread to his men. One of Major General John G. Walker’s Texas infantrymen wrote:
…As a soldier, [Taylor] has been wonderfully successful. Though some of his movements savored of rashness, when calmly weighed, they showed the good judgment and military genius that conceived them. When once he forms and opinion, he acts upon it with an unbending, uncompromising resolve.19
The ensuing battle of Mansfield on April 8 resulted in a smashing victory for Taylor. His men attacked and caught three enemy divisions strung out along the road through the woods leading to the town. Taylor’s army struck each division separately and defeated them in turn. The Federals lost 113 killed, 581 wounded, and 1,541 missing or captured twenty artillery pieces, nearly 200 supply wagons, and thousands of infantry and cavalry weapons.20
Throughout the battle, Taylor had remained calm, a trait which he showed all during the war. An infantry captain recorded in his diary that during the Confederate attack “General Taylor sat with his leg crossed on his saddle, smoking a cigar.”21 Even when ill and cross, Taylor seemed to respond to battle, which transferred him, as staff officer David F. Boyd remembered, into a “pleasant and playful” kitten.22 After the war, Taylor’s chief of artillery recalled that Taylor was on of the two high-ranking officers he observed whose voices remained calm in battle. Major Joseph L. Brent said that he had talked to Taylor often under fire and had “been impressed with the naturalness of his voice and the absence of any
19 O. R., 1, XXXIV, Pt. 1, 526, 563-64; Taylor, Destruction and Reconstruction, pp. 191-95; John G. Walker, The War of Secession West of the Mississippi River During the Years 1863-4-5 (n. p., n. d.), pp. 49-50; J. P. Blesington, The Campaigns of Walker’s Texas Division (New York, 1875), 184.
20 O. R., 1, XXXIV, Pt. 1, 263-64, 273, 391-92, 452, 527, 564-65.
21 Quoted in Bartlett, Military Record of Louisiana, “The Trans-Mississippi,” 13.
22 New Orleans Times-Democrat, January 31, 1897.
indications of excitement to which he was made subject upon other occasions.”23
Tactically, the battle of Mansfield had been carried out with considerable skill by Taylor. As Professor Ludwell Johnson points out, more might have been accomplished if the entire Confederate army had attacked at once instead of piecemeal, but Taylor wanted Brigadier General Alfred Mouton’s division, especially his Louisiana troops, to draw first blood.24 Taylor might have thrown in the fresh troops of the two Arkansas divisions just arriving from Shreveport, but several considerations prevented him from doing so. First, they could not have added much to the victory that was achieved; second, supplies in the area were scant; third, the battlefield was limited in size by the terrain and might not have accommodated the additional men; and fourth, it probably would have been difficult to persuade Mouton’s and Walker’s men to allow themselves to be relieved and prevented from following up their victory.25
After the defeat at Mansfield, the Federal army fell back to Pleasant Hill. Banks sent the remnants of the forces engaged at Mansfield back to Grand Ecore and deployed the 12,000 men who had not been engaged in extremely haphazard manner. Ludwell Johnson wrote of Bank’s dispositions: “A worse placement of troops for defensive operations could scarcely be envisioned.”26 In drawing up his battle plan for April 9, Taylor tried to take advantage of the Federal dispositions. He envisioned a flank attack rather than a frontal assault. The two Arkansas divisions, accompanied by three regiments of cavalry, would strike the Federal left and roll it up. Once this had been accomplished, the three cavalry regiments would advance down the Natchitoches road and cut off the enemy’s retreat via that route.
Once this attack got under way, Walker’s division would advance and connect its right flank with the Arkansas troops’ left. One brigade of cavalry Taylor scheduled to push into and through Pleasant Hill whenever the Federal left was crushed. A fully cavalry division would then outflank the Federal right and cut the remaining route of retreat. If Successful, Taylor’s plan would result in the
23 Joseph Lancaster Brent, Memoirs of the War Between the States (New Orleans, 1940), p. 148.
24 Johnson, Red River Campaign, p. 142; Taylor, Destruction and Reconstruction, p. 195.
25 Johnson, Red River Campaign, p. 142.
26 O. R., 1, XXXIV, Pt. 1, 183, 452, and Pt. 3, 99; Johnson, Red River Campaign, p. 166.
Virtual destruction of Bank’s forces on the field by defeating them while they were widely scattered. Taylor had approximately 12,500 men on the field, a bare numerical superiority over the enemy. Unfortunately, Taylor’s flanking force did not extend its lines far enough, and the Federals repulsed its attack. As a consequence, none of the rest of Taylor’s plan could work. The battle of Pleasant Hill ended in a tactical defeat for Taylor, but Bank’s retreat during the night to Grand Ecore turned it into a strategic victory.27
Taylor had shown a great deal of skill in the battles of Mansfield and Pleasant Hill. In both engagements he had successfully gained numerical superiority at every point of attack. Jackson had employed this tactic brilliantly in the Shenandoah Valley, Jomini had strongly advocated achieving mass against enemy fractions, and Taylor undoubtedly drew from both Jackson and Jomini in making his battle plans. Taylor’s pursuit of Banks and attack at pleasant Hill followed Napoleon’s theory of a vigorous pursuit of a defeated enemy and were in the best tradition of the military principle of momentum or movement. The conduct of these two battles by Taylor demonstrated generalship of a high order.
To Taylor’s great dismay, Kirby Smith decided after the battle of Pleasant Hill to take away from Taylor the two Arkansas divisions and Walker’s Texas Division He wanted to conduct what proved to be a fruitless pursuit of the Federal force in Arkansas. This left Taylor with fewer than 6,000 men to follow Banks in his retreat down Red River. Commenting on Kirby Smith’s decision, Ludwell Johnson stated:
…Kirby Smith regarded Steele’s capture as a certainty and Bank’s as a gamble, and so he decided to play for the smaller stakes. Apparently he did not realize that while the Union could play that way and win, the Confederacy could not.28
Taylor nevertheless resolved to do everything in his power to prevent the escape of the Federal Army and fleet on Red River. Despite declining health, he threw all of his energy and mental resources into the campaign and came close to gaining a spectacular victory against heavy odds.
27 O. R., 1, XXXIV, Pt. 1, 566-68; Taylor, Destruction and Reconstruction, pp. 201-06.
28 O. R., 1, XXXIV, Pt. 1, 480-81, 546-47, 572; Taylor, Destruction and Reconstruction, p. 213-18; Johnson, Red River Campaign, p. 281.
As the Federals retreated down Red River, Taylor twice divided his command in the face of superior odds and attempted to break up Bank’s army. Ludwell Johnson called Taylor’s strategy “remarkably bold and sweeping.”29 Much of the Federal army was too demoralized and fatigue to fight the Confederates. At Alexandria, the enemy fleet found itself tapped above the rapids near the town, and Banks had to stop there to try to extricate the gunboats. For slightly more than two weeks, Taylor laid siege to an army which numbered about 30,000 men with fewer than 6,000 men. Only the construction of a dam in the river allowed the Federal fleet to get past the rapids. Taylor could not stop the dam builders because his army was too small. The Federals proceeded down the river, discomfited by Taylor’s harassing attacks on their flank and rear, until they reached Simmesport and crossed the Atchafalya River to safety.30
The Red River Campaign was one of the last major successes for the Confederacy, and it had been won entirely by Taylor’s strategy and tactics. Partially because of necessity and partially because of his cunning, Taylor had allowed Banks to penetrate deep into the state. Then he turned quickly from the defensive to the offensive, striking hard at Mansfield and defeating several elements of the Federal army in detail. His masterful strategy at Pleasant Hill came to grief when the flank attack failed, but the vicious Confederate assault persuaded Banks to retreat to Grand Ecore. Pursuing Banks, Taylor’s small army skirmished with the enemy daily, keeping him on the move and his morale low. Twice Taylor divided his outnumbered force in the face of the enemy in attempts to trap him, but both times fate prevented success.
In retrospect, the campaign could only have been conducted or concluded better if Kirby Smith had left the Arkansas and Texas infantry divisions, or at least the latter, with Taylor to pursue Banks. General Walker did not doubt the outcome of the campaign had Kirby Smith not interfered:
To this fatal blunder Banks was indebted for his safety, for it is morally certain that if the whole force of the Confederates had been thrown upon his shattered and demoralized army it’s [sic]
29 Johnson, Red River Campaign, p. 233.
30 Taylor, Destruction and Reconstruction, pp. 219-32; Walker, The War of Secession, p. 69; Johnson, Red River Campaign, p. 224.
Escape, as an organized force, would have been almost impossible…31
I again quote Professor Johnson:
…if Taylor had had these troops with him at Monett’s Ferry, he might well have captured or dispersed Bank’s army and forced Porter to destroy his fleet. At the very least, even if the Federals had succeeded in reaching the Mississippi, it could have been done only by running a fearful gauntlet.32
Banks certainly would have been forced to destroy his gunboats at Alexandria, as he could never have constructed the damn there. This result alone would have been a severe blow to the Federal control of the Mississippi River. We can only speculate as to what the eventual outcome of a disaster on Red River would have been for the Federal war effort.
At the end of the Red River Campaign, Taylor asked to be relieved from any further duty under Kirby Smith. The latter, incensed by the blistering criticisms Taylor leveled at him, gladly obliged. Taylor received a promotion to lieutenant general from the Confederate Congress for his conduct of the campaign. The Congress, in a joint resolution, also officially thanked Taylor and his men for their victories.33 Taylor’s next assignment was the command of the Department of Alabama, Mississippi, and East Louisiana. He served competently in this position but had no further opportunities to display his skills as a commander. On May 8, 1865, Taylor surrendered the last Confederate army east of the Mississippi River to the Federals.34
With no prior military experience, Richard Taylor rose from Colonel to lieutenant general because of his ideas on strategy and the brilliant generalship he demonstrated on the field of battle. During the war, Taylor exhibited all the traits of an exceptional military leader: intelligence, education, courage, and Character. He never suffered a crushing defeat even though he met with reverses. Time and again he beat the enemy and carved his name among those of the most outstanding Confederate generals.
31 Walker, The War of Secession, pp. 56-57.
32 Johnson, Red River Campaign, p. 281.
33 O. R., 1, XXXIV, Pt. 1, 547-48, 597, and Pt. 4, 664; Taylor, Destruction and Reconstruction, p. 239; Journal of the Congress of the Confederate States of America, 7 vols. (Washington, D. C., 1904-1905), IV, 49.
34 O. R., 1, XXXIX, Pt. 2, 778; Taylor, Destruction and Reconstruction, pp. 274-76.